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I. INTRODUCTION

After the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Corbello v. Iowa
Production decision in 2003, litigation by landowners seeking
compensation for alleged environmental damage to their property,
commonly known as legacy litigation, increased dramatically,
particularly in relation to oil and gas exploration and production
sites. 1 In response to Corbello, the Louisiana legislature enacted
Act No. 312 (hereinafter “Act 312” or “the Act”) of the 2006
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, primarily in an effort
to ensure that contaminated oil and gas exploration sites were
remediated to the extent necessary to protect the public interest.
Part II of this article briefly addresses the historical background
of legacy litigation, through and including Act 312. It will draw
primarily upon my previous article, “Legacy Litigation” and Act
312 of 2006, published in the Tulane Environmental Law Journal. 2
Part III of this article reviews certain major issues arising since the
enactment of Act 312 and how courts have dealt with these issues.
The issues addressed include the scope of damages, the need to
remediate environmental damages, the extent of remediation
required, and the proper timing of litigation. 3 Finally, Part IV
examines the battle to amend legacy litigation law in the 2012
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature and analyzes the new
laws as enacted.

1. 02-0826 (La. 2/25/03); 850 So. 2d 686.
2. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 347 (2007).
3. For example—whether suits are brought too early or too late, who has
the right to sue, and constitutional issues.
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II. FROM CORBELLO TO ACT 312
Since the oil and gas industry entered Louisiana with the
discovery of the Jennings Field in 1901, landowners have
occasionally sued for alleged damage to their property. 4 However,
the nature and extent of such litigation changed drastically after the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa
Production. 5
In Corbello, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that in a claim
for breach of a contractual obligation to restore property, damages
need not be “tethered” to the value of the property, thus allowing
landowners to assert and receive damages that disregarded, and
largely exceeded, the fair market worth of the property. 6 Further,
the court held that a landowner who collected such damages could
not legally be required to remediate the offending contamination. 7
This decision created, or, at a minimum, highlighted, a scenario in
which property was worth more polluted than not, and landowners
could sue for and collect large amounts of damages yet leave the
property in its allegedly polluted state. Predictably, Corbello
resulted in increased attention to legacy litigation. Three years
later, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act No. 312 of the 2006
Regular Session as a direct response to Corbello and the similar
lawsuits that followed. 8
Act 312’s provisions have been summarized as follows by the
Louisiana Supreme Court:
First, the act requires timely notice of such litigation to the
State. Second, the act stays the litigation until thirty days
after notice is given. Third, the act permits the State to
intervene in the litigation. Fourth, the act provides a role for
the Office of Conservation with the Louisiana Department
4. See Andrepont v. Acadian Drilling Co., 231 So. 2d 347 (La. 1969); see
also Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1953); see also Rohner v.
Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1958).
5. Corbello, 850 So. 2d 686. See generally Pitre, supra note 2.
6. Corbello, 850 So. 2d at 693.
7. Id. at 701.
8. While Corbello gets most of the credit for the increased litigation
activity, large judgments in other cases alleging contamination doubtlessly
contributed to the rise in litigious activity. See, e.g., Grefer v. Alpha Technical,
02-1237, p. 32–33 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/05); 901 So. 2d 1117, 1141–42
(affirming a $56 million award of damages for remediation of property worth at
most $1.5 million); Dore Energy, Corp. v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 04-1373, p. 7
(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/05), 901 So. 2d 1238, 1242 (affirming that, under certain
circumstances, a lawsuit could go forward while oil, gas, and mineral lease
remained in effect).
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of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) in the determination of the
most feasible plan for evaluation and/or remediation of
environmental damage. Fifth, the act provides for the
payment of all damages for the evaluation or remediation
of environmental damages and further provides that the
Court shall oversee actual implementation of the plan
adjudicated to be “most feasible.” Sixth, the act allows the
landowner and the State to recover attorney and expert fees,
as well as costs from the responsible party or parties. 9
In 2012, six years after the enactment of Act 312, the
legislature amended it for the first time. The rest of this article
reviews certain major developments under Act 312 since 2006,
including the new legislation enacted this year.
III. FROM ACT 312 TO 2012
Since Act 312’s enactment, cases subject to the Act have been
addressed in Louisiana courts at every level. In deciding these
cases, the courts have addressed the procedural aspects of Act 312,
as well as legal issues not directly related to the Act.
A. Issues Addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court
Over the last few years, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
issued several decisions addressing issues relevant to Act 312 and
legacy litigation. Importantly, the Court determined that Act 312
was constitutional in its 2008 M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil
Corp. decision. 10 Other issues addressed by the Court include
whether pre-suit notice is required, 11 when an action has
prescribed, 12 and whether a subsequent landowner can sue for
damages to property occurring prior to its acquisition of the
property. 13

9. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 29 (La. 7/1/08);
998 So. 2d 16, 36 (citations omitted); see also Pitre, supra note 2, at 350–54
(identifying the six major components of Act 312 and providing a more detailed
discussion of the provisions of Act 312).
10. 998 So. 2d at 38.
11. Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 09-0449 (La. 10/20/09); 24 So. 3d 813.
12. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10) ; 45 So. 3d 991.
13. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267 (La.
10/25/2011); 79 So. 3d 246.
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1. Constitutionality—M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
In 2006, M.J. Farms, Ltd. filed suit against various oil and gas
companies, alleging that the defendants caused environmental
damage to its property. 14 Specifically, M.J. Farms alleged that the
defendants’ oil and gas exploration and production activities
contaminated the surface, subsurface, ground waters, and
subsurface aquifers. 15 M.J. Farms sought damages under Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 31:22, a statute obliging the owner of a
mineral servitude “insofar as practicable, to restore the surface to
its original condition at the earliest reasonable time.” 16
While the suit was pending, Act 312 was passed and one of the
defendants filed a motion to enforce the stay provision of the
Act. 17 M.J. Farms opposed the stay on two grounds: (1) the Act
was inapplicable to its claims because Act 312 only amended Title
30 of Louisiana’s Revised Statutes, and not Title 31, 18 and (2) the
Act violated the Louisiana State Constitution by depriving the
plaintiffs of vested rights in their causes of action. 19 After the
Louisiana Attorney General submitted a memorandum urging the
constitutionality of Act 312, the district court ruled, without
elaboration, that Act 312 was unconstitutional under both the
Louisiana and United States Constitutions.
Following various procedural entanglements 20 the matter was
considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which found that Act
14. M.J. Farms, Ltd. V. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07–2371, p. 1–3 (La. 7/1/08);
998 So. 2d 16, 20–21.
15. Id.
16. Id. at p. 2–3, 998 So. 2d at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 5, 998 So. 2d at 22.
19. Id. at 20, 998 So. 2d at 31.
20. In April 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the district court’s
first judgment, holding that Act 312 was unconstitutional, dismissed the appeal
of the ruling, and remanded the case on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to
properly raise its constitutional argument in a formal pleading. M.J. Farms, Ltd.
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-0450 (La. 4/27/07); 956 So. 2d 573, 573. Following
that ruling, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Strike and/or for
Declaratory Judgment Declaring Act 312 of 2006 Unconstitutional and
Inapplicable to the Instant Act in the state district court. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., Docket No. 24055 “A”, 7th Judicial District Court, Parish
of Catahoula, Louisiana. Defendants then removed the case to federal court on
the basis that the plaintiff’s federal constitutional challenge to Act 312 conferred
federal question jurisdiction over the case. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 2007 WL 2081008, at *1 (W.D. La. 2007). The United States District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana, however, remanded the proceedings
back to the state court, where the trial judge again ruled without elaboration that
Act 312 was unconstitutional. Id. at *2; M.J. Farms, Ltd., Docket No. 24055
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312 was constitutional. 21 The Court rejected M.J. Farms’ argument
that the retroactive application of the Act violated due process. 22
The retroactive application of the Act did not alter the parties’
substantive rights or divest M.J. Farms of its causes of action; it
only changed the remedy available to plaintiffs. 23 Plaintiffs have
no substantive, constitutionally protected right to recover money
damages in lieu of a defendant’s specific performance of its
remediation obligations. 24
The Court also noted two important policy concerns that are
furthered by the retroactive application of Act 312: (1) the
protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the public by
ensuring that environmental damage will actually be remediated;
and (2) providing real substance to the expertise of the Louisiana
Office of Conservation (“LOC”) and the LDNR regarding oilfield
remediation. 25 Act 312 does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of
the district court over civil matters in violation of Article V,
Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution.26 The district court’s
jurisdiction over all civil matters is original, but not exclusive.27
Act 312 instructs the district court to refer the matter to the
LOC/LDNR upon a finding that that environmental damage indeed
exists and identifying the responsible party, which does not offend
Article V, section sixteen. 28
2. Prescription—Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc.
Plaintiffs alleged contamination from underground gasoline
storage tanks at a nearby gas station. 29 The tanks had been replaced
in 1997 after the discovery of leaks. 30 In 2001 and 2002, the LDEQ
sent letters to plaintiffs informing them of environmental
contamination in the vicinity and that there was a possibility that

“A”. As before, Judge Johnson did not elaborate on the reasoning behind her
ruling. Defendants appealed this second ruling by the district court. Because the
judgment found a statute unconstitutional, the appeal was heard by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. See LA CONST. art. 5, § 5(d).
21. M.J. Farms, Ltd. V. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07–2371, p. 32 (La. 7/1/08);
998 So. 2d 16, 38.
22. Id. at 36, 998 So. 2d at 29.
23. Id. at 37–38, 998 So. 2d at 31–32.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 39 (Johnson, J., concurring).
26. M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 36–37.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 37.
29. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So. 3d 991, 995.
30. Id.
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gasoline had migrated or would migrate in the future onto
plaintiffs’ property. 31 The letters also revealed the presence of
chemicals associated with gasoline in the area, and an attached
map established that tests were conducted on the plaintiffs’
property. 32 The LDEQ recommended that the landowners limit the
amount of time they spent in the noted areas and disclosed that it
was in the process of finalizing a contract for the remediation. 33
In 2007, plaintiffs filed suit against the neighboring landowner,
the gas station operator, and Chevron seeking damages for
diminution of value of the property. 34 Defendants filed motions for
summary judgment claiming that plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed
one year after plaintiffs acquired, or should have acquired,
knowledge of the contamination and damage to their property from
the letters in 2001 and 2002. 35 The Louisiana Supreme Court
accepted review of the district court’s denial of these motions. 36
The applicable prescriptive period for tortious conduct causing
damage to immovable property is one year, which runs from the
day the property owner had actual or constructive knowledge of
the damage. 37 Constructive knowledge is notice that is enough to
excite attention and put the injured party on guard, and whether it
exists depends on the reasonableness of the injured party’s action
or inaction in light of the surrounding circumstances. 38
Plaintiffs argued that it was reasonable for them to wait for
further notice from the LDEQ rather than to file suit in 2002
because the letters did not provide definitive evidence of
contamination, did not state whether the contamination exceeded
acceptable limits, and indicated that the investigation was
ongoing. 39 The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument.
The Court found that the letters clearly indicated the presence of
damage in the form of undesirable levels of contaminates on the
property and noted the disclosure that a remediation contract was
being finalized, which was a clear indication that matters had
advanced beyond mere investigation. 40 While the letters did not
specifically inform plaintiffs that the soil and groundwater on their
property was contaminated, it was “beyond peradventure” that they
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 995–96.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 997–98.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001.
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provided sufficient information to excite attention and put
plaintiffs on notice that they had a reasonable basis to pursue a
claim. 41 Waiting more than five years to file suit was unreasonable,
and the plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed. 42
This decision sends a message to landowners that they have a
burden to investigate possible claims when they receive
information that their property might be contaminated.
Landowners who ignore signs of contamination and then claim that
they waited to file suit until they knew the extent of the damage or
had definitive evidence of damage will face a challenge in
successfully defeating an exception of prescription.
3. Prescription and Scope of Remediation—Marin v. Exxon
Mobil Corp.
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. involved two pieces of property—
the “Marin Property” and the “Breaux Property”—in St. Mary
Parish upon which Exxon or its predecessors (collectively,
“Exxon”) conducted oil and gas exploration, production, and
transportation activities. 43 Both the Marin and the Breaux
properties had also been used for sugarcane cultivation. 44 Pursuant
to leases on the properties dating back to the 1930s, Exxon
installed and operated oil and gas facilities on the properties, and,
as was industry custom at the time, Exxon used unlined pits to
dispose of the byproducts of its oil and gas operations. 45 The water
produced in the pits was discharged into a nearby waterway. 46
By the 1980s, plaintiffs were concerned about sugarcane
growth in the areas around the pits. 47 Between 1988 and 1990, they
made numerous demands upon Exxon to clean up the property so
they could continue to grow sugarcane. 48 Around that time, in
1986, the LDNR amended Statewide Order 29-B 49 to require the
registration and closure of existing unlined oil pits and the
remediation of various contaminates to certain standards. 50
41.
42.
43.
239.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
240.

Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 1001.
Id.
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10) ; 48 So. 3d 234,
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240.
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 101-641 (1987).
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10); 48 So. 3d 234,
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Between 1987 and 1991, Exxon closed all of the remaining pits on
plaintiffs’ properties and “represented that it was remediating the
pit areas to Statewide Order 29-B standards.” 51
After the Corbello decision, plaintiffs hired an environmental
expert to test the properties, and the expert reported that there was
significant contamination present. 52 In November 2003, plaintiffs
filed suit against Exxon asserting claims sounding in tort and
contract “for remediation of the soil and groundwater and other
damages arising out of Exxon’s activities.” 53 The trial court found
that Exxon’s deposit of chemicals on plaintiffs’ properties
constituted negligent operations by Exxon, resulting in breach of
contract and negligence. 54 The trial court rejected Exxon’s
arguments that the plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed and found that
contra non valentem suspended the running of prescription until
the expert reports were received in 2003. 55 The Court of Appeal
affirmed. 56 The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ
applications of both Exxon and plaintiffs to address several
assignments of error. 57
a. Prescription
Contra non valentem, 58 which applies only in exceptional
circumstances, suspends the running of prescription where the
cause of action is neither known nor reasonably knowable by the
plaintiff, even though plaintiff’s ignorance is not induced by the
defendant. 59 Knowledge sufficient to start the running of
prescription is information, which, if pursued, will lead to the true
condition of things, considering the reasonableness of the
51. Id.
52. Id. at 240–41.
53. Id. at 241.
54. Id. at 242.
55. Id.
56. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 243.
57. Id. at 244.
58. As a defense to prescription, plaintiffs often assert the theory of contra
non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, which literally means “no
prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action.” Edmundson v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 924 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1991). Contra non valentum
operates as an exceptional remedy to the general rule of prescription and must
be strictly construed. Ellender v. Goldking Prod. Co., 99-0069, p. 8 (La. App. 1
Cir. 6/23/00); 775 So. 2d 11, 17. The doctrine focuses on factors outside of the
plaintiff’s control that prevent the plaintiff from bringing an action. Edmundson,
924 F.2d at 82.
59. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 245. Contra non valentem also suspends the running
of prescription in other situations, which are not relevant for the purposes of this
Article and are not discussed here.
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plaintiff’s action in light of his education, intelligence, and the
nature of the defendant’s conduct.
The court outlined plaintiffs’ knowledge and found that contra
non valentem did not suspend the running of prescription on
plaintiffs’ claims. By the late 1980s, plaintiffs knew that sugarcane
would not grow in areas surrounding the pits and that Exxon had
been dumping in the pits for years. 60 They had made multiple
requests that contamination be removed from the area. 61 Between
1987 and 1991, they knew that Exxon was closing the pits and that
sludge remained in the pit bottoms.62 Post-1991, plaintiffs knew
that healthy sugarcane crop was still not growing in the area. 63 The
Court also noted that no new damage became apparent after
1991. 64
The Court acknowledged that a “layperson could not have
discovered the contamination on the property without the
assistance of an expert.” The Court then looked to the Hogg
constructive knowledge analysis to determine whether the failure
to grow sugarcane should have alerted the plaintiffs of potential
contamination and prompted them to seek out an expert. 65 While
the information in the letters in Hogg was far more detailed than
the information plaintiffs here had, the sugarcane damage was an
“outward sign of ‘actual and appreciable damage’ that was
sufficient to excite attention and put the plaintiffs on guard.”66
Plaintiffs knew that healthy sugarcane should have grown within
four years of the 1991 planting. 67 As a result, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge at
least by 1995. 68 The fact that an expert may be needed to
determine the extent of damage in an oilfield contamination case
does not prolong the prescriptive period until an expert is actually
hired. 69 It was unreasonable for plaintiffs to wait until 2003 to hire
an expert and file suit, and by that time, their claims had
prescribed. 70 This decision takes plaintiffs’ burden to investigate
potential claims for property damage even further than the Court in

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Marin, 48 So. 3d at 249.
Id. at 249–50.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2012]

LOUISIANA LEGACY LAWSUITS

103

Hogg by indicating that there is a duty to investigate triggered by
even more abstract knowledge of contamination.
b. Scope of Remediation
Plaintiffs argued that Exxon should be liable for restoring the
property to its original pre-lease condition based on (1) the lease
provisions; and (2) the rule delineated in Terrebonne Parish
School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc. 71 arguing that Castex
recognized an implied duty of restoration to the property’s original
condition. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected both of these
arguments. The original 1941 lease contained no restoration
provisions. 72 In 1994, the parties executed a novation of the 1941
lease that required the lessee to “restore the leased premises as near
as reasonably practicable to its present condition.” 73 Because the
1994 novation of the lease extinguished the 1941 lease, the Court
found that the term “present condition” in the novation could not
relate back to the 1941 lease. 74 Accordingly, the Court rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that the lease provisions required restoration to
the original 1941 condition.
The Louisiana Supreme Court then addressed plaintiffs’
argument based on the rule in Castex. In Castex, the Court held
that “in the absence of an express lease provision, Mineral Code
article 122 does not impose an implied duty to restore the surface
to its original, pre-lease condition absent proof that the lessee has
exercised his rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively.” 75
Plaintiffs argued that this rule applied because Exxon exercised its
rights under the lease unreasonably and excessively. 76 The Court
distinguished Castex because Castex addressed whether restoration
was necessary at all, whereas here the issue is the extent of
restoration. 77 The obligation to correct the damage due to
unreasonable or excessive operations does not necessarily mean
that the lessee has a duty to restore the land to its pre-lease
condition. 78 Here, the Court acknowledged that Exxon operated
unreasonably or excessively, but found that its additional
restoration duty was the duty to correct the consequences of
71. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 04-0968 (La.
1/19/05); 893 So. 2d 789.
72. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 257.
73. Id. at 258.
74. Id. at 258–59.
75. Id. at 257.
76. Id. at 259.
77. Id.
78. Marin, 48 So. 3d at 260.
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unreasonable or excessive use, not to restore the property to its
original condition. 79
4. Subsequent Purchaser—Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v.
Amerada Hess Corp.
In Eagle Pipe, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined what is
commonly known as the “subsequent purchaser doctrine.” 80 The
subsequent purchaser doctrine provides that “an owner of property
has no right or actual interest in recovering from a third party for
damage which was inflicted on the property before his purchase, in
the absence of an assignment or subrogation of the rights
belonging to the owner of the property when the damage was
inflicted.” 81
Plaintiff, Eagle Pipe, purchased property in Lafayette Parish in
1988. 82 From 1981 until 1988, the previous owners leased the
property to Union Pipe, a company that operated the property as a
pipe yard where it bought, stored, and sold used oilfield tubing. 83
After Eagle Pipe purchased the property, the Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”), following-up on an alleged
field interview, found that the property was contaminated with
Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive
Materials (“TENORM”). 84 The LDEQ cited Eagle Pipe for
violating TENORM exposure regulations and ordered that the
property be remediated. 85
Eagle Pipe then filed suit against several groups of defendants
which it alleged caused the contamination, including the previous
owners and various companies that sold or transported the
TENORM contaminated pipe to the property. 86 The defendants
urged the exception of no right of action, arguing that Eagle Pipe
had no right to assert a claim for damage to the property which
occurred before Eagle Pipe was its owner. 87 The trial court granted
the exception. 88 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
79. Id.
80. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267 (La.
10/25/11); 79 So. 3d 246. While this decision relates to the contamination of a
pipe-cleaning yard, its analysis extends to cases subject to Act 312 involving oil
and gas exploration and production sites.
81. Id. at 256–57.
82. Id. at 253.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 254.
85. Id.
86. Eagle Pipe, 79 So. 3d at 254.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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originally affirmed the trial court’s decision; however, on
rehearing the Fourth Circuit vacated its previous judgment and
reversed the trial court’s ruling. 89 The Louisiana Supreme Court
granted writs to determine the bounds of the subsequent purchaser
rule.
Within its plea to both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and
the Louisiana Supreme Court, Eagle Pipe attempted to carve out an
exception to the subsequent purchaser rule in an attempt to
circumvent its application when the prior damage to property was
not overt or apparent at the time of the sale. 90 Eagle Pipe argued
that the contamination on its property was not apparent at the time
of its purchase, and, therefore, the subsequent purchaser rule
should not apply to preclude it from seeking damages against the
entities alleged to have caused the contamination. 91
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument and held
that the subsequent purchaser rule applies regardless of whether
the damage was apparent at the time of the sale. 92 Significantly,
when there is apparent damage to the property, the law does not
allow a subsequent purchaser to profit by permitting it to negotiate
a lower purchase price based on the condition of the property and
have a separate right to seek damages from the tortfeasor who is
responsible for the property’s poor condition. 93 And when the
damage is not apparent, the law only provides the subsequent
purchaser “with the right to seek rescission of the sale, or a
reduction in the purchase price,” but not the right to also sue for
damages against the tortfeasor. 94 In either instance, “the personal
nature of the right of the landowner at that time does not change,
and remains with the landowner unless the right is explicitly
assigned or subrogated to another.” 95
Under the subsequent purchaser rule as articulated in Eagle
Pipe, absent an explicit assignment or subrogation of the previous
owner’s rights, landowners may not recover in tort for property
damages incurred before they acquired the land, even when the
damages are not apparent. While this Louisiana Supreme Court
decision certainly has not eliminated all legacy lawsuits based
upon historic contamination to property, in many instances it
significantly limits the scope of such lawsuits and the claims of
current landowners.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 254–55.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 257
Eagle Pipe, 79 So. 3d at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id.
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B. Other Issues in Act 312 Cases
Several other significant issues arising in Act 312 cases have
been addressed by other courts, including the Louisiana courts of
appeal and federal district courts, while many of the major issues
have been fought in the district courts with varying results. Some
of these issues and court decisions are discussed below.
1. One Trial or Two?
There has been some question about whether Act 312 allows
for a preliminary hearing to first determine whether environmental
damage exists and identify a responsible party, or whether this
should be determined at a full-blown trial (usually by a jury) along
with the landowners’ private claims. Though courts have
recognized that the Act is ambiguous on this point, courts have
generally sided with plaintiffs, arguing that there should be one
trial to determine all issues. 96 While this result avoids piecemeal
litigation and the potential for inconsistent judgments, it also
delays both the formulation of a remediation plan and the
remediation itself.
2. What are the Appropriate Regulatory Standards for
Remediation?
For the past quarter-century, the Office of Conservation has
followed the standards under its Statewide Order No. 29-B. 97
These standards involve various limits for various substances
(chlorides, heavy metals, etc.) in different environments (uplands,
wetlands, etc.). 98 LDEQ, on the other hand, created its Risk
Evaluation/Corrective Action Program (“RECAP”) document,
which uses risk-based standards similar to those formulated by the
96. See, e.g., Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy USA Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 954,
958 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting that the statute can be read two ways and adopting
the interpretation set forth in Duplantier Family Partnership v. BP Amoco that a
single trial, rather than separate trials, is proper. 07-0293 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2007),
955 So. 2d 763); Duplantier Family P'ship v. BP Amoco, 07-0293 (La. App. 4
Cir. 2007), 955 So. 2d 763 (unpublished opinion) (noting that bifurcated trials
require the consent of all parties under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
and finding that Act 312 does not mandate two trials and that having one trial
promotes judicial efficiency).
97. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 101–641 (1987).
98. See id.
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Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). 99 In 2010, the Office
of Conservation proposed its own risk-based documents, the Site
Evaluation and Remediation Procedures Manual (“SERP
Manual”), and came very close to adopting it before deciding not
to do so (or at least ceasing all effort), leaving the matter somewhat
unsettled. 100
3. What are the Means by which a Landowner may Obtain
Damages in Addition to the Remediation to Regulatory
Standards Required by Act 312?
Plaintiff attorneys have promoted a number of theories to
support damages over the amount required to remediate the
property to regulatory standards. Damages have been sought for
storage of hazardous materials, trespass, and stigma resulting in
diminution of property value. 101 Plaintiffs have also asserted
entitlement to damages for the cost of remediation beyond any
required regulatory remediation. 102 The likelihood of success based
on these theories has not been resolved, but their potential for
success creates settlement value.
4. May a Defendant Admit Responsibility for Remediation
without Admitting Liability on the Landowners’ Claims for
Additional Damages?
On its face, Act 312 seems to allow defendants to admit
responsibility for remediation without admitting liability for
additional damages. 103 But because plaintiffs have generally
99. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, §§ 1301–1309 (2012); Risk Evaluation/
Corrective Action Program (RECAP), LA. DEP’T OF EVNTL. QUALITY (2003),
available
at
http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/DIVISIONS/Underground
StorageTankandRemediationDivision/RemediationServices/RECAP/RECAPDocu
ment2003.aspx.
100. La. Office of Conservation, Notice of Intent, 2010 La. Reg. Text
211335.
101. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10); 48 So. 3d
234; see also Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So. 3d 991;
see also Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98–2326, p. 13 (La. 6/29/99); 737
So. 2d 720, 731.
102. See State v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 10-1341 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2/1/12); 85 So. 3d 158, cert granted 12-0884 (La. 6/15/12); 92 So. 3d 340
(addressing whether Act 312 limits the recoverable remediation damage to the
cost of the feasible plan identified by the LDEQ).
103. See, e.g., Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy USA Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 954,
958 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting that the statute can be read to allow the issue of
damages to be tried separately from the issue of liability for remediation).
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convinced judges to rule that admission of responsibility for
environmental damage requires admission of civil liability for
private damage claims, defendants have been reluctant to admit
responsibility. 104 As a result, remediating the property before trial
has been unlikely as a practical matter. This is a victory for the
plaintiff lawyers and can ultimately delay remediation for years.
5. Does Act 312 Apply in Federal Court?
Cases that would be subject to Act 312 have been before
federal courts on several occasions. 105 Plaintiffs have argued that
the Burford abstention doctrine 106 warrants the federal court’s
abstention based on Louisiana’s Act 312. 107 Some federal courts
have rejected these arguments and refused to abstain under
Burford. 108 While federal courts have exercised jurisdiction over
cases that would be subject to Act 312, there is still some question
about whether Act 312 should apply in federal court. It is a long
recognized principle that federal courts sitting in diversity apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law. 109 But this has
not stopped at least one federal court from interpreting and
applying Act 312—a law recognized both by that court and by
Louisiana courts as a procedural law. 110
104. See, e.g., Tensas Poppadoc, Inc. v. Chevron, 07-927 (La. App. 3 Cir.
5/21/08); 984 So. 2d 223, 229; Germany v. Conoco Phillips Co., 07-1145 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08); 980 So. 2d 101, 103–04; see also Savoie v. Richard.,
Docket No. 10-18078, 38th Judicial District Court, Cameron Parish, Louisiana.
105. See Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-01100,
2011 WL 3878329 (W.D. La. Sept. 1, 2011); C.S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Co.
of Cal., No. 09-2762, 2009 WL 2765814 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2009); Brownell
Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
106. The Burford abstention doctrine provides that federal courts should not
interfere with proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies when (1)
there are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then
at bar;” or (2) the “exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in
similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” C.S. Gaidry, Inc., 2009
WL 2765814 at *7 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)).
107. C.S. Gaidry, Inc., 2009 WL 2765814 at *4; Brownell Land Co., 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 958.
108. C.S. Gaidry, Inc., 2009 WL 2765814 at *4; Brownell Land Co., 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 959.
109. Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (citing
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1939)).
110. See Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 957–58 (noting that “[t]he
Act is clearly a procedural law” and then determining whether the Act requires a
separate determination of liability and damages); M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon
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In Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., the defendant filed a
motion in limine essentially seeking to have the issues of liability
and damages tried separately. 111 In ruling on the defendant’s
motion, the Court stated that Act 312 was “clearly a procedural
law,” and then went on to analyze Act 312 and even cited to a
Louisiana case that relied on the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure in deciding the same issue. 112 Admittedly, determining
the proper law to apply in diversity cases is often difficult and
requires consideration of complex issues. 113 But there is at least a
valid argument that Act 312 is a procedural law that should not be
applied in federal diversity cases.
C. The Practical Dynamics of Act 312 Litigation.
In practice, many of the issues discussed above do not get
resolved by the courts, because these legacy cases tend to settle
before trial. Generally, plaintiffs’ experts will assert that the
appropriate remediation will cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Defense experts usually have a less sensational assessment of the
need for and extent of remediation. The competing expert
assessments drive the vast majority of cases to settlement, with the
landowners typically accepting some money (often a large amount,
but a modest percentage of their experts’ damage estimate) in
exchange for the agreement to stop urging a remediation plan
costing hundreds of millions of dollars and to allow the defendants
to remediate the property according to the regulatory standards
acceptable to the Office of Conservation.
During the 2011 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature,
the oil and gas industry supported S.B. 146 by Senator Adley and
the duplicate H.B. 563 by Representative Cortez. The original bills
were short “placeholder” bills intended to be amended as they went
through the legislative process. Extensive amendments were
circulated shortly before a House Natural Resources Committee
hearing on HB 563, and, subsequently, the bill was involuntarily
deferred in committee, effectively killing the legislation for the

Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So. 2d 16 (“We find it clear Act 312
attaches a procedure ‘for judicial resolution of claims for environmental
damage’”) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (West 2008)).
111. Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 955, 958.
112. Id. at 957–58.
113. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.
Ct. 1431 (2010); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 (referring to the Erie analysis as a
“challenging endeavor”).
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session. 114 Consequently, the Legislature requested that the
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources study the matter and
report its findings. 115
That report was published on February 1, 2012. 116 The report,
prepared by J. Blake Canfield, Senior Attorney in the Louisiana
Office of Conservation, thoroughly recounted the history of Act
312 and set the stage for a legislative battle in 2012. 117 The report
stated, among other things, that of the 271 legacy lawsuits subject
to Act 312, 60 did not provide a specific site description, and only
61 were supported by testing data submitted to the LDNR (as
required by the law). 118 Only two of those had been identified by
the Office of Conservation to have long-term risk. 119 As of the
publication of the report, only one case had gone through a
complete hearing process at the Office of Conservation, and no
plans had been adopted or implemented by any court pursuant to
Act 312. 120
In addition, 64 cases settled. Twenty-nine of these settlements
were made without the Office of Conservation receiving
environmental data. 121 Of the remaining 35 cases, 32 had
environmental data showing no need to remediate to achieve
regulatory standards. 122 Only three of the 64 settled cases required
remediation. 123 The subject properties in those three cases were
remediated. 124

114. History of H.B. 563, Reg. Sess. (La. 2011), available at http://www.
legis.state.la.us (follow “Session Info” hyperlink; then follow “2011 Regular
Legislative Session.; then search for “HB 563”; then click on “History”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
115. H.C.R. 167, Reg. Sess. (La. 2011).
116. J. Blake Canfield, Senior Attorney, La. Office of Conservation, Report
to the House Committee on Natural Resources and Environment and Senate
Committee on Natural Resources as Requested in House Concurrent Resolution
167, 2011 Legislative Session, February 1, 2012, available at http://www.scribd.
com/doc/82935877/DNR-Report-to-House-and-Senate-NR (transmitted under
cover of letter dated February 1, 2012 by Scott A. Angelle, Secretary, La. Dept.
of Natural Resources).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 17–18.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 20–21.
121. Canfield, supra note 116, at 21–22.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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IV. THE 2012 AMENDMENTS TO LEGACY LEGISLATION
The Office of Conservation’s report provided the backdrop for
the exhausting and controversial process of re-assessing Act 312
during the 2012 regular legislative session. 125
A. The Proposals
At least twenty-three bills relating to legacy litigation, some of
which were duplicates, were filed in the 2012 Regular Session.126
Generally, these bills fell into three groups.
125. Id.
126. These bills included: S.B. 731, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Allain)
(provides relative to remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production
sites), substitute adopted, S.B. 760, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Allain)
(provides relative to qualified admission of responsibility for remediation of
oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); S.B. 555, Reg. Sess. (La.
2012) (Sen. Adley) (provides for the remediation of oilfield sites and exploration
and production sites); S.B. 528, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Long) (provides for
remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); S.B. 443,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Sen. Morrell) (provides relative to limited admission of
liability in lawsuits for environmental damages); S.B. 240, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012)
(Sen. Murray) (provides relative to certain mineral lease indemnification
agreements); H.B. 1180, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Harrison) (provides for
remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); H.B. 1037,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Montoucet) (provides for the Louisiana Land
Owners Protection Act); H.B. 920, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Johnson)
(provide exemplary damages for environmental damages); H.B. 897, Reg. Sess.
(La. 2012) (Rep. Harrison) (provides with respect to remediation of oil fields);
H.B. 863, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Montoucet) (provides for lessee’s
obligation to restore the leased premises); H.B. 862, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep.
Lambert) (provides with respect to civil actions for environmental damages);
H.B. 853, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Montoucet) (provides for the Louisiana Land
Owners Protection Act); H.B. 678, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Jim Morris) (provides
for the restoration of certain oilfields); H.B. 642, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep.
Montoucet) (provides for the remediation of certain oilfield sites); H.B. 618,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides relative to the admission of
liability for environmental damage); H.B. 649, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Jim
Morris) (provides for the remediation of certain oilfield sites); H.B. 482, Reg.
Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Montoucet) (provides for discovery in cases involving
certain environmental damage from oilfield operations); H.B. 463, Reg. Sess.
(La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides relative to pleading and discovery in
certain civil actions); H.B. 460, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson)
(provides civil procedures for the remediation of oilfield sites); H.B. 458, Reg.
Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides for notice of breach of a mineral
lease); H.B. 454, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Abramson) (provides relative to
bifurcation of trials); H.B. 388, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Johnson) (provides
indemnification for environmental damages to an oilfield site); H.B. 235, Reg.
Sess. (La. 2012) (Rep. Harrison) (provides relative to mineral lease
indemnification agreements).
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First, the bills by Senator Morrell and Representative
Abramson were supported by the Louisiana Oil and Gas
Association (“LOGA”). After considering several issues that it
would like addressed, LOGA concentrated on one narrow, but
important change—allowing a defendant to admit responsibility
for the purpose of conducting a cleanup (and thus clear the way to
move forward with remediation) without admitting liability on the
landowner’s claims for additional damages. 127 The language of Act
312 seems to permit this, but plaintiffs have generally convinced
judges to rule the other way. 128 This makes it difficult to get the
property remediated before trial, allowing the remediation to be
delayed for years. The practical difficulty of defendants to
remediate without admitting liability puts plaintiffs in a favorable
posture before the jury. Under such a regime, plaintiffs could argue
before the jury that the property has not been cleaned up— a point
that was considered by many to be quite effective.
Other bills by Representatives Montoucet, Johnson, and
Lambert were supported by an alliance of some of the main law
firms representing the landowner-plaintiffs in legacy lawsuits.
Predictably, these bills promoted positions that strongly favored
the landowners’ actions against parties conducting oil and gas
exploration and production activities on their properties. Some
bills proposed voiding existing contracts by retroactively
prohibiting certain indemnity agreements in purchase and sale
agreements, and others would reverse rulings of the Louisiana
Supreme Court by allowing a current landowner to sue for
damages occurring before that landowner owned the property. 129
Finally, a third group of bills introduced by Senator Alain,
Senator Long, and Representative Harrison was promoted by
Jimmy Faircloth, former executive counsel to Governor Bobby
Jindal and now attorney to Roy O. Martin Lumber Company, a
large landowner. While Mr. Faircloth initially characterized his bill
as a “compromise,” his proposal contained several elements that
were not supported by LOGA. 130 While Mr. Faircloth accepted
127. Testimony by Gifford Briggs and Loulan Pitre, Jr. at Hearing of the
House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure, April 17, 2012.
128. See supra Part II(B).
129. See, e.g., H.B. 388, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (prohibiting indemnification
for environmental damage to an oilfield site); H.B. 862, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012)
(provides with respect to environmental damages).
130. S.B. 731, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides relative to remediation of
oilfield sites and exploration and production sites); S.B. 528, Reg. Sess. (La.
2012) (provides for remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production
sites); H.B. 1180, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides for remediation of oilfield sits
and exploration and production sites).
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that a defendant should be able to admit responsibility for a
cleanup without admitting liability on the landowners’ claims for
additional damages, he proposed that the admission and
remediation plan adopted as a consequence not be admissible in
evidence at trial unless the State has formally intervened in the
litigation. Given that the State has thus far intervened in only 19 of
271 cases, as a practical matter this would keep the jury from
knowing the remediation plan recommended by the Office of
Conservation and would facilitate the landowners’ arguments for
excessive remediation plans.
B. The Legislative Compromise
The outcome of the legislation remained uncertain until May
16, 2012, when a compromise package was announced 131 and was
ultimately enacted into law, becoming effective on August 1,
2012. 132 The compromise package enacts articles 1552 and 1563
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and amends and reenacts
portions of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29. 133 The
package does not apply to cases in which an order setting the case
for trial was entered on or before May 15, 2012 (even if that trial is
later continued), and it specifically provides that the LDNR does
not maintain primary jurisdiction. 134
The key provisions proposed by the oil and gas industry are
contained within the package. Most of the compromise package
addresses admissions of responsibility for environmental damage
and their consequences. 135 However, the package also creates two
other very novel procedures: the option for a preliminary hearing
that could result in parties obtaining a preliminary (but perhaps
tenuous) dismissal without prejudice, and a one-year suspension of

131. Capitol News Bureau, Legislative Briefs for May 17, 2012, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 17, 2012, available at http://theadvocate.com/
home/2849235-125/legislative-briefs.
132. The compromise consisted of Act No. 754 (House Bill 618) and Act No.
779 (Senate Bill 555). H.B. 618, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides for a
preference for services by companies domiciled in Louisiana relative to a public
bid process); S.B. 555, Reg. Sess. (La. 2012) (provides for remediation of
oilfield sites and exploration and production sites).
133. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE OF CIV. PROC. arts. 1552, 1563); 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B.
555) (West) (enacting portions of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29).
134. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE OF CIV. PROC. arts. 1552, 1563).
135. Id.
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prescription established when plaintiffs file a “notice of intent to
investigate.” 136
1. Key Components of the Provisions Dealing with Limited
Admissions and Their Consequences
a. Limited Admissions of Responsibility
A party admitting liability under Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:29 may make a “limited admission,” i.e., limit the
admission to responsibility for a remediation to applicable
regulatory standards. 137 In other words, the admitting party need
not waive defenses to private claims for additional damages. After
a limited admission, the court shall make a timely referral to the
Office of Conservation to conduct a public hearing to approve or
structure a remediation to regulatory standards. 138
b. Admissibility of Plan and Proceedings
The limited admission, the plan approved by the Office of
Conservation, and written agency comments shall be admissible
evidence at trial. 139 Parties may subpoena agency personnel
involved in formulation of the remediation plan after the
remediation plan is submitted to the court, subject to payment of
subpoena response costs. 140
c. Environmental Management Orders
The court must enter an environmental management order to
facilitate investigation and environmental testing upon request of
any party or the Officer of Conservation in any case subject to
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29. The order shall address

136. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (enacting portions
30:29).
137. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(1)–(2) (West) (Titled “Limited admissions of
liability in environmental damage lawsuits; effect”)).
138. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (amending LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) (West)).
139. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(3) (West)).
140. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (enacting LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(5) (West)).
OF LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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access, sampling and testing protocols, and provide specific time
frames for testing and sampling. 141
d. Deadline for Limited Admissions
If one party makes a limited admission, the other parties must
file any limited admissions within 60 days. However, all limited
admissions must be made within 90 days of the completion of
environmental testing in accordance with the environmental
management order set by the court. 142
e. Procedure for Formulation of the Remediation Plan
The formulation of remediation plans after an admission of
responsibility is limited to one time per case. 143 Ex parte
communication with agency personnel is prohibited while a
remediation plan is being formulated. 144 Comment by the
Department of Agricultural and Forestry, the Department of
Environmental Quality, and the Department of Natural Resources
will be allowed if the Office of Conservation preliminarily
approves a remediation plan that applies the regulatory standards
of that agency or provides an exception from the Office of
Conservation's standards. 145 The Office of Conservation and the
court are empowered to facilitate implementation of a plan once
adopted, including the ability to require the cooperation of the
current operator. 146
f. Responsibility for Certain Costs
A party admitting responsibility shall be required to deposit
funds to cover the Office of Conservation’s costs with an initial
deposit of $100,000. The party admitting responsibility shall also
reimburse the plaintiffs’ costs as provided by Louisiana Revised

141. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1552 (West)).
142. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(4)–(5) (West)).
143. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (amending LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(2) (West)).
144. Id.
145. Id. (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(3) (West 2007)).
146. Id.
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Statutes section 30:29(E)(1) in an amount determined by the
court. 147
g. Waiver of Punitive Damages
A party admitting responsibility for environmental damage
waives any right to claim indemnity for punitive damages. 148
2. Novel Procedural Changes
a. Preliminary Hearing and Dismissal Without Prejudice
Defendants may request a preliminary hearing, at which
affidavits and written evidence will be allowed, to determine
whether good cause exists for maintaining the defendant as a party
in the litigation. Successful defendants will be dismissed without
prejudice, subject to being brought back in upon discovery of
evidence not reasonably available at the time of the preliminary
dismissal. A defendant obtaining a preliminary dismissal will be
entitled to a dismissal with prejudice following a final nonappealable judgment in the case. 149
b. Notice of Intent to Investigate and Suspension of Prescription
Plaintiffs may suspend prescription for up to one year by filing
a notice of intent to investigate, which must identify the property,
the alleged environmental damage, all known owners of the
property, and the current operator. Subsequent lawsuits must
include all environmental testing results. 150
V. CONCLUSION
Act 312 of 2006 created Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:29 in the hope of bringing more rationality and consistency to
legacy litigation alleging environmental damage arising from oil
and gas exploration and production operations. In practice, Act 312
created new legal issues for parties and their lawyers to litigate,
and little remediation of contaminated properties has actually been
147. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 754 (H.B. 618) (West) (enacting LA.
CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 1563(A)(6) (West)).
148. 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 779 (S.B. 555) (West) (enacting LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(L)).
149. Id. (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29(B)(6) (West)).
150. Id. (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29(B)(7) (West)).
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achieved. In 2012, the Louisiana legislature re-visited the issue and
enacted the first amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:29 and new related provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure. The expressed goal of these amendments is to facilitate
expedited remediation of actual contamination as may be necessary
to protect the public safety. Doubtlessly, lawyers for both
landowners and industry will once again argue over how these new
provisions will be interpreted and applied. Only time will tell the
result.

